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Retail payments: integration and innovation 
“Retail payments: integration and innovation” was the title of the joint conference organised by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) in Frankfurt am Main on 25 and 26 May 2009. Around 200 high-level 
policy-makers, academics, experts and central bankers from more than 30 countries of all five continents attended the 
conference, reflecting the high level of interest in retail payments. 
The aim of the conference was to better understand current developments in retail payment markets and to identify 
possible future trends, by bringing together policy conduct, research activities and market practice. The conference was 
organised around two major topics: first, the economic and regulatory implications of a more integrated retail payments 
market and, second, the strands of innovation and modernisation in the retail payments business. To make innovations 
successful, expectations and requirements of retail payment users have to be taken seriously. The conference has shown 
that these expectations and requirements are strongly influenced by the growing demand for alternative banking 
solutions, the increasing international mobility of individuals and companies, a loss of trust in the banking industry and 
major social trends such as the ageing population in developed countries. There are signs that customers see a need for 
more innovative payment solutions. Overall, the conference led to valuable findings which will further stimulate our 
efforts to foster the economic underpinnings of innovation and integration in retail banking and payments. 
We would like to take this opportunity to thank all participants in the conference. In particular, we would like to 
acknowledge the valuable contributions of all presenters, discussants, session chairs and panellists, whose names can be 
found in the enclosed conference programme. Their main statements are summarised in the ECB-DNB official 
conference summary. Twelve papers related to the conference have been accepted for publication in this special series 
of the ECB Working Papers Series. 
Behind the scenes, a number of colleagues from the ECB and DNB contributed to both the organisation of the 
conference and the preparation of this conference report. In alphabetical order, many thanks to Alexander Al-Haschimi, 
Wilko Bolt, Hans Brits, Maria Foskolou, Susan Germain de Urday, Philipp Hartmann, Päivi Heikkinen, Monika 
Hempel, Cornelia Holthausen, Nicole Jonker, Anneke Kosse, Thomas Lammer, Johannes Lindner, Tobias Linzert, 
Daniela Russo, Wiebe Ruttenberg, Heiko Schmiedel, Francisco Tur Hartmann, Liisa Väisänen, and Pirjo Väkeväinen. 
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1 Introduction
Even through payment cards are gradually becoming the most popular and most eﬃcient means
of payments in many countries, there is a growing suspicion surrounding the pricing of credit
cards. Retailers complain that the fees they have to pay to accept credit card transactions are out
of proportion with the costs incurred by banks. Some competition authorities and central banks
have suggested banks provide consumers with exaggerated incentives to use their credit cards, to
the detriment of other means of payments like cash and debit cards which they believe to be more
eﬃcient. The usual suspects are the interchange fees, the transfer fees paid by the bank of the
retailer to the banks of the cardholders, which are often considerably higher than those for debit
Abstract
We build a model of credit card pricing that explicitly takes into account credit functionality. We show 
that a monopoly card network always selects an interchange fee that exceeds the level that maximizes 
consumer surplus. If regulators only care about consumer surplus, a conservative regulatory approach 
is to cap interchange fees based on retailers’ net avoided costs from not having to provide credit 
themselves. In the model, this always raises consumer surplus compared to the unregulated outcome, 
sometimes to the point of maximizing consumer surplus. 
cards.1 In the past several years, there have been more than 50 lawsuits concerning interchange
1Unregulated credit card interchange fees are typically between 1% to 2% of transaction value, whereas debit
card interchange fees are typically between 0% and 1%. See, for instance, Charts 2 and 3 in Weiner and Wright
(2005).5
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fees ﬁled by merchants and merchant associations against card networks in the United States,
while in about 20 countries public authorities have take regulatory actions related to interchange
fees and investigations are proceeding in many more (Bradford and Hayashi, 2008).
Given the obvious importance of understanding how interchange fees should be set, this article
analyzes credit card interchange fee determination to see whether there are grounds for regulatory
intervention, and if so, in what form. The point of departure from the existing literature is to
model credit cards explicitly. An existing literature models price determination in payment cards
networks, initiated by Schmalensee (2002), Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2003).2 The
models in this literature have essentially focused on the choice between payment cards (which
could just as well be debit cards) and cash (or checks). We contribute to this literature by
extending the models to allow a separate role for the credit functionality of credit cards, thereby
allowing us to discuss credit card interchange fees speciﬁcally.3
In our model, credit cards can be used for two types of transactions — “ordinary purchases”
for regular convenience usage for which cash (or a debit card) are assumed to provide identical
beneﬁts, and for “credit purchases” where credit is necessary for purchases to be realized. Credit
purchases include a range of diﬀerent types of purchases (such as unplanned purchases, impulse
purchases and large purchases) for which the consumer does not have the cash or funds imme-
diately available to complete the purchase or for purchases for which the deferment of
payment facilitates the transaction. For ordinary purchases, we assume credit cards are
ineﬃcient given we assume there are additional costs of transacting with credit cards. As a result,
card networks which maximize proﬁt by maximizing the number of card transactions have an in-
centive to encourage over-usage of credit cards by convenience users (even when these consumers
do not need the credit facility) provided merchants still accept such credit card transactions. A
card network does this by setting interchange fees high enough to induce issuers to oﬀer rewards
and cash back bonuses (equivalent to negative fees). On the other hand, the alternative to using
credit cards for credit purchases is the direct provision of credit by merchants or “store credit”,
2See also Baxter (1983) for a much earlier treatment, and Rochet (2003) for a survey of the literature.
3Among the few papers to model explicitly the credit functionality are Chakravorty and To (2007) and more
recently Bolt and Chakravorty (2008), although these papers do not focus on the determinant of interchange fees
for credit cards, nor the regulation of these fees.6
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which is assumed to be relatively ineﬃcient. Since consumers do not internalize retailers’ cost
savings from avoiding direct provision of credit and since merchants cannot distinguish the type
of consumer they face, there is also a case for setting a relatively high interchange fee so that
consumers that wish to rely on credit are induced to use credit cards when it is eﬃcient for
them to do so. For this reason, to maximize consumer surplus (including the surplus of cash
customers) may require setting an interchange fee which induces excessive usage of credit
cards for ordinary purchases.
Taking into account both types of transactions, a monopoly card network always sets its
interchange fee too high in our setting. Thus, if regulators only care about (short-run) consumer
surplus, our theory can provide a rationalization for placing a cap on interchange fees.4 The
theory suggests one of two possible caps will maximize consumer surplus. Depending on the
relative costs and beneﬁts of the diﬀerent instruments, the cap should either be based on the
issuers’ costs (to avoid excessive usage of cards for ordinary purchases) or on merchants’
net avoided costs from not having to provide credit directly (so that consumers use their cards
eﬃciently for credit purchases). Since evaluating which of the two options gives higher consumer
surplus is informationally very demanding, a conservative regulatory approach would be to cap
interchange fees using the maximum of these two levels, which is likely to be the latter option.
In our model, this always raises consumer surplus compared to the unregulated outcome, and will
sometimes result in the best outcome for consumers. In contrast, using issuer costs to regulate
interchange fees is realistically only likely to give a lower bound of possible interchange fees
that maximize consumer surplus.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of consumers (of total mass normalized to one) with quasi-linear preferences.
They spend their income on a composite good taken as a num´ eraire and on retail goods costing
γ to produce. There are two payment technologies: cash (which could also capture cheques and
debit cards5) and credit cards. Credit cards are assumed to be more costly but allow consumers
4In focusing on consumer surplus, we ignore the need for issuers to recover ﬁxed costs and the eﬀect this has
on entry incentives (and therefore, on long-run consumers surplus). We also ignore the need to get consumers to
internalize the eﬀect of their decisions on the proﬁt of issuers so as to maximize total welfare. As Rochet and
Tirole (2008) show, taking these eﬀects into account justiﬁes higher interchange fees.
5Since the focus of this paper is on the provision of consumer credit, we do not introduce any diﬀerences
between pure payment technologies. Such diﬀerences are discussed at length in the literature mentioned in the
introduction, e.g. Schmalensee (2002), Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2003).7
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to purchase on credit. They are held by a fraction x of consumers, where x is initially taken
as given.6 Consumers purchase one unit of the retail good (what we call “ordinary purchases”)
providing them with utility u0 with u0 >γ . In addition, with probability θ, they also receive
utility u1 from consuming another unit of the retail good (what we call “credit purchases”). We
assume that merchants cannot bundle the two transactions and also cannot distinguish between
“ordinary” and “credit” purchases. We assume that each consumer has always enough cash to
pay for his ordinary purchases, but must rely on credit for credit purchases.
Each retailer can directly provide credit to the consumer (“store credit”), but this entails a
cost cB for the consumer (buyer) and cost cS to the retailer (seller). The cost cS is the same
for all credit purchases from a given seller, but cB is transaction speciﬁc, and is observed by
the consumer only when he is in the store. cB is drawn from a continuous distribution with the
cumulative distribution function H. We assume the distribution has full support over some range
(cB,cB)w h e r ecB is suﬃciently negative, such that cardholders will sometimes choose to
use store credit,a n dcB is positive but not too high (in comparison with u1 −γ), such that
consumers will always prefer to make the credit purchase (even if they have to pay with
store credit) than not buy at all.7 Initially, we assume cB only arises with respect to
credit purchases, and represents the net cost of using store credit rather than credit
cards for credit purchases, which is why we allow the possibility of negative draws
of cB. In section 4 we will analyze what happens when cB is instead interpreted as
a transaction cost that arises equally for ordinary purchases and credit purchases.
Given the costs of store credit, accepting credit cards is a potential means for merchants
to reduce their transaction costs of accepting credit purchases and to increase the quality of
service to buyers. The cost of a credit transaction is cA for the bank of the merchant (which
is called the acquirer of the transaction) and cI for the bank of the cardholder (the issuer of
the card). The total cost of a credit card transaction is thus c = cA + cI. Bank fees for credit
card transactions are denoted f for consumers and m for merchants. When f<0 (cash back
bonuses) consumers prefer to also use their credit cards for ordinary purchases, which given our
assumptions is socially wasteful.8 For each credit card transaction, an interchange fee a is paid
6In section 4 we extend the model to allow consumers to decide whether to join the card network or not.
7Without this assumption, credit card acceptance would not just add value by reducing the
transaction costs of arranging credit; it would also lead to an increase in the volume of credit
purchases, which would provide an additional factor aﬀecting eﬃcient interchange fees.
8We assume consumers and retailers face no costs of using cash (which can be thought of as a normalization).
For ordinary purchases, any costs or beneﬁts to consumers and retailers of using cash are assumed to be the
same as those obtained from using credit cards (which can be thought of as an approximation).8
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by the bank of the merchant (the acquirer) to the bank of the consumer (the issuer).
For simplicity, we assume that acquiring merchants is perfectly competitive for banks, which
implies that the merchant fee m is equal to the sum of the acquiring cost cI and the interchange
fee a:
m = cI + a. (1)
By contrast, we assume that issuers are imperfectly competitive: the cardholder fee f is equal
to the net issuer cost cI − a plus a proﬁt margin π, assumed for simplicity to be constant. We
thus have:
f(a)=cI − a + π. (2)
These assumptions are not made to necessarily capture any intrinsic asymmetry
between the nature of competition in issuing and acquiring, the existence of which
is an empirical matter. Rather, the main reason for making these particular as-
sumptions on bank competition is that they provide a simple setting in which card
networks seek to maximize proﬁt by maximizing the number of card transactions.
The level of the interchange fee a has an impact on retailer cost and thus on the retail price9
p(a), which results from competition between retailers. To model competition between retailers,
we use the standard Hotelling model: consumers are uniformly distributed on an interval of
unit length, with one retailer (i =1 ,2) located at each extremity of the interval. Transport
cost for consumers is t per unit of distance. We consider the case where credit card service are
provided by a single network (monopoly). Its objective is to maximize total proﬁts of its member
banks, which is proportional to total volume of credit card transactions. As noted above, this
simpliﬁcation is due to our assumption that banks’ proﬁt margins are constant (0 for acquirers,
π for issuers).
The timing of our model is as follows:
• The card network sets the interchange fee a so as to maximize banks’ total proﬁt.
• Banks set their fees: f(a)=cI − a + π for cardholders and m(a)=cA + a for retailers.
• Retailers independently choose their card acceptance policies: Li = 1 if retailer i accepts
credit cards, 0 otherwise.
9We assume that retailers cannot, or do not want to, charge diﬀerent retail prices for cash and card payments
(i.e. no surcharging).9
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• After observing (L1,L 2), retailers independently set retail prices p1,p 2.
• Consumers observe retail prices and card acceptance policies and select one retailer to
patronize.
• Once the consumer is in the store, he buys a ﬁrst unit of the retail good (“ordinary pur-
chase”), and pays it by cash or a credit card (if he has one).
• Finally, nature decides whether he has an opportunity for a credit purchase (this occurs
with probability θ) and in this case, the cost cB of using store credit for the buyer is drawn
according to the c.d.f. H, with full support on [cB,¯ cB]. Cardholders then select their mode
of payment.
In the framework above we assumed that consumers sometimes will obtain a negative draw
of cB (i.e. cB < 0). This was one way to ensure store credit is not dominated by credit cards.
Despite this, we also assumed store credit is never used for ordinary purchases. We did this
by assuming that for ordinary purchases consumers can only choose between cash and credit
cards, consistent with the net cost of using store credit always being positive for
ordinary transactions. This helps to simplify the analysis. Subsequently, we will show
our results continue to hold even when consumers may sometimes prefer store credit
for ordinary purchases. Another reason why store credit may not be dominated by credit
cards is that some consumers will not want to hold credit cards unless the costs of doing so are
suﬃciently subsidized (or they receive suﬃcient rewards for doing so). We, thus, also analyze an
alternative speciﬁcation in which we endogenize the choice by consumers of whether to hold a
credit card in the ﬁrst place but then assume the cost to consumers of using store credit cB is
always positive. These two extensions are analyzed in Section 4.
3 Analysis and policy implications
We ﬁrst analyze the model to derive optimal interchange fees. This involves determining when
retailers will accept credit cards so as to determine what interchange fees a card network will
set. We then compare this to the interchange fees that maximize consumer surplus and derive
some policy implications.10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1138
December 2009
3.1 When Do Retailers Accept Credit Cards?
This section derives the equilibrium behavior of retailers as a function of the fundamental policy
variable in our model, namely the interchange fee a. We ﬁrst construct a retailer’s proﬁt function.
We will use the notation Lc =1i ff<0,L c =0i ff ≥ 0t od i s t i n g u i s hw h e t h e rc r e d i t
cards are used for ordinary purchases or not. A fraction 1 − xLi of the time, consumers cannot
use credit cards. For ordinary purchases, such consumers must therefore use cash. For credit
purchases, which happen with probability θ, these consumers will always use store credit. A
fraction xLi of the time, consumers can also use credit cards. For ordinary purchases, these
cardholders will use cash if f ≥ 0 (i.e. if Lc = 0) and credit cards if f<0 (i.e. if Lc =1 ) .
For credit purchases, which happen with probability θ, these cardholders will use store credit if
cB <fbut otherwise will use credit cards. Collecting together a retailer’s margins associated
with each of these diﬀerent possibilities, retailer i’s expected margin per-customer is therefore
equal to
Mi =( 1 − xLi)(pi − γ + θ(pi − γ − cS))
+xLi (pi − γ − Lcm + θ(H (f)(pi − γ − cS)+( 1− H (f))(pi − γ − m)))
or after simplifying
Mi =( 1+θ)(pi − γ) − θcS − xΓ(a)Li,
where
Γ(a)=Lcm + θ(m − cS)(1− H (f))
is the retailer’s expected net cost per-cardholder from accepting cards as a function of the inter-
change fee.
Corresponding to each of the diﬀerent types of possible transactions, retailer i oﬀers an
expected surplus (ignoring transportation costs) of
Ui =( 1 − xLi)(u0 + θu1 − (1 + θ)pi − θE(cB))
+xLi










Ui = u0 + θu1 − (1 + θ)pi − θE(cB)+xS (a)Li,
where
S (a)=−Lcf + θ
 ¯ cB
f
(cB − f)dH (cB)11
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is the expected net consumer surplus per-cardholder from credit card usage as a function of the
interchange fee. Determining retailer i’s market share by ﬁnding the indiﬀerent consumer in the











Retailer i’s proﬁt function can then be written πi = Misi. Let us denote by φ(a) the diﬀerence




(cB + cS − c − πI)dH(cB) − (c + πI)Lc. (4)
The ﬁrst term represents total expected surplus of the two users (consumers and retailers) from
using credit cards for consumers’ credit purchases. The second term is a deadweight loss asso-
ciated with the use of credit cards for ordinary purchases. We are now ready to derive
the equilibrium choices of retailers. We ﬁrst derive equilibrium resulting from price competition
between retailers for given card acceptance decisions L1,L 2.
Proposition 1 For any couple L1,L 2 of card acceptance decisions, price competition between
retailers leads to retail prices such that
(1 + θ)p∗
i = t + γ(1 + θ)+θcS + xΓ(a)Li +
x
3
φ(a)(Li − Lj). (5)
Retailers’ proﬁts are π∗
i =2 t(s∗
i)









Proof of Proposition 1: See the Appendix.
So as to maximize proﬁt, each retailer chooses to accept cards if it increases its market share,
which will be the case whenever φ(a) ≥ 0. An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 is:
Proposition 2 Retailers accept credit cards at equilibrium if and only if expected consumer
surplus from card transactions exceeds expected retailer cost. That is, L∗
1 = L∗
2 =1if and only if
φ(a) ≥ 0, i.e. S (a) ≥ Γ(a).
10We assume that t is large enough so that each retailer always has a positive market share at equilibrium
(0 <s i < 1 for all i). We also assume that u0 + θu1 is large enough so that all the market is served (Ui >t s i for
all i).12
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3.2 Analysis of Retailer Prices and Consumer Surplus
This section considers the impact of the interchange fee a on consumer surplus. Obviously this
question only matters in the region where S(a) ≥ Γ(a), i.e. when credit cards are accepted.
Proposition 1 allows us to compute retail prices and consumer surplus as a function of a.
Considering the case where L1 = L2 =1a n dt h u sp1(a)=p2(a)=p(a), formula (5) gives
(1 + θ)p(a)=t + γ(1 + θ)+θcS + xΓ(a). (7)
Since Γ(a) (the expected net retailer cost from card transactions) increases in a we obtain an
immediate corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium retail price is an increasing function of the interchange fee a.
The expected surplus of cash consumers (those not holding credit cards) is
Ucash(a)=u0 + θu1 −
t
4
− (1 + θ)p(a) − θE(cB)
and of consumers holding credit cards is
Ucredit(a)=u0 + θu1 −
t
4









If we aggregate the surplus of all consumers (cash consumers and cardholders) and take into
account equilibrium prices from (7), we obtain
CS(a)=xUcredit(a)+( 1− x)Ucash(a)




Thus, aggregate consumer surplus is equal, up to an additive and a positive multiplicative con-
stants, to total user surplus φ(a).
The following three ﬁgures show how total user surplus φ varies with the level of the inter-
change fee a.N o t e
dφ(a)
da
= θ(−a + cS − cA)h(cI + πI − a), (8)
so φ(a) obtains a local maximum11 at a = aT ≡ cS − cA (as illustrated in the ﬁgures). The
value aT is conceptually the same as what Rochet and Tirole (2008) call the “tourist test
11Indeed, formula (8) shows that
dφ
da is positive for a<a T and negative for a>a T, implying a local maximum
of φ for a = aT.13
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threshold”, i.e. the maximum level of the interchange fee such that the merchant fee m = cA +a
is less than the cost cS of the relevant alternative technology (i.e. which in a credit card setting
is store credit) for the merchant. This threshold is also conceptually equivalent to the
interchange fee recommended by Baxter (1983) in the context of a perfectly competitive banking
sector, and to Farrell’s (2006) “Merchant Indiﬀerence Criterion”. Note, however, aT is not
necessarily a global maximum for total user surplus φ. This is because φ has a downward jump
at a = a∗ ≡ cI + πI. This jump is due to the fact that when a>a ∗, cardholder fee f becomes
negative, and cardholders ﬁnd it convenient to use their credit card for ordinary purchases. In
formula (6) this is captured by the fact that Lc =1if and only if a>a ∗, implying a
downward jump of magnitude c+πI for total user surplus φ. This jump complicates the analysis
of consumer surplus maximisation, and introduces three regimes.
In regime 1, aT = cS − cA is less than a∗ ≡ cI + πI, and therefore total user surplus is
maximized for a = aT. This corresponds to the situation where credit card transactions are more
costly to provide than retailer provided store credit:
cS − cA ≤ cI + πI ⇔ cS ≤ c + πI.
In regime 1, regulation to maximize consumer surplus would require making sure credit cards
were priced to be more expensive for consumers than using cash (or debit cards).
The more realistic cases are captured by regimes 2 and 3, which correspond to the reverse
situation. In regime 2 the incidence of convenience users is not so large (so that aT is still the
maximum of total user surplus). By contrast in regime 3, the maximum of φ is obtained at a∗.
First regime: total user surplus is maximum for a = aT <a ∗.14
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Second regime: total user surplus is maximum for a = aT >a ∗.
Third regime: total user surplus is maximum for a = a∗
In all regimes, ¯ a denotes the interchange fee selected by a monopoly network.
3.3 Policy Implications
Recall that the volume of credit card transactions, and thus the proﬁt of banks, increase with a.
This implies that a monopoly card network will set an interchange fee equal to the maximum level
¯ a that is compatible with merchant acceptance of payment cards. This level is always greater
than both aT and a∗. Therefore, if competition authorities aim at maximizing (short-term)
consumer surplus (or equivalently φ(a)), they will always ﬁnd the privately optimal interchange15
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fee excessive.12 A regulatory cap on interchange fees can therefore be justiﬁed but the appropriate
level of the cap is not always the same: it is aT in regime 2 and a∗ in regime 3. Which of these
regimes is relevant depends on the magnitude of the diﬀerence between cS, the retailer’s cost
of providing store credit and c + πI, the total user cost of credit transactions. We denote this
diﬀerence by δ ≡ cS − c − πI. These results are recapitulated in the next proposition:
Proposition 3 If regulatory authorities aim at maximizing (short-term) consumer surplus, pri-
vately optimal interchange fees are too high. A regulatory cap on interchange fees can therefore
raise (short-term) consumer surplus, but two cases must be considered, depending on the value
of δ = cS − c − πI:
a) If δ<0 (regime 1)o ri fc + πI ≤ θ
 0
−δ (cB + δ)dH (cB) (regime 2), the regulatory cap
should be aT = cS − cA.
b) Otherwise (regime 3), the regulatory cap should be a∗ = cI + πI.
Proof of Proposition 3: See the Appendix.
The proposition implies that the interchange fee aT = cS − cA achieves the global maximum
of φ(a)p r o v i d e d( i )δ<0 or equivalently aT ≤ a∗ = cI + πI (i.e provided Lc =0a taT,w h i c h
corresponds to regime 1) or (ii) if δ>0 (i.e. Lc =1a taT) provided that θ
 0
−δ (cB + δ)dH (cB) ≥
c + πI (this corresponds to regime 2). Regime 2 arises when the drop in surplus caused by
ineﬃcient use of credit cards for ordinary purchases is not too great. Regime 3 arises when
the deadweight loss from excessive use of credit cards by convenience users dominates. In either
case, lowering interchange fees from the private maximum to aT unambiguously raises consumer
surplus. This is immediately deduced from the following ﬁgure, which plots the gains from
regulation as a function of the incremental cost parameter δ, which can be expected to be
smaller for large retailers than for small retailers. The ﬁgure shows that a cap based on retailer
avoided cost (a ≤ aT) always increases consumer surplus, while a cap based on issuer cost
(a ≤ a∗) may sometimes decrease consumer surplus (when δ is negative enough) with respect to
the unregulated monopoly situation, as may be the case for very large retailers.
12This is not necessarily true anymore if competition authorities aim at maximizing long-term consumer surplus
or social welfare, which includes banks’ proﬁts (see Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2008) or if merchants are heterogenous
(see Wright, 2004).16
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Therefore, given it would be extremely diﬃcult in practice for a regulator to determine
which of these regimes prevails, a conservative approach to regulation would be to cap the
interchange fee at aT. This cap is relatively easy to construct. It is based on a retailer’s net
avoided costs. This is the retailer’s cost saving from not having to provide credit directly, or in
other words, the cost of providing credit itself less the cost of the acquiring service oﬀered by
its bank (i.e. the costs incurred by the retailer’s bank in providing the retailer with the ability
to accept credit cards, including any such costs that are passed onto the merchant other than
the interchange fee).13 In contrast, the interchange fee a∗ (which is based on the issuers’ cost)
represents a lower bound for desirable interchange fees if either of the more realistic regimes
2 or 3 hold, since then any interchange fee lower than a∗ unambiguously lowers consumers
surplus and welfare. This could be used as a check to make sure the calculated aT is not too
low. Thus, regulations which base interchange fees on issuer costs could be rationalized in
our framework, althoughrealistically, only as a lower bound on what might be desirable for
consumers.
4 Alternative speciﬁcations
In reaching the policy implications above, we adopted a model in which cardhold-
ers sometimes prefer using store credit for credit purchases. Despite this, in the
model consumers never use store cards for ordinary purchases. This reﬂected our
assumption that the costs to consumers and retailers of using credit cards and store
credit (and therefore the possibility of a net beneﬁt of store credit to consumers)
only arises with respect to the use of credit. According to this view, consumers
13Note that aT may diﬀer for diﬀerent classes of retailers by contrast with a∗ which only depends on the issuer.17
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never have an incentive to use store credit for ordinary purchases given credit is
not needed for these purchases. An alternative view is that the costs of store credit
measure the costs of using these instruments for transactions in general, regardless
of whether they are ordinary purchases or credit purchases. Consistent with this
view, in this section, we consider two diﬀerent setting in which we assume the costs
of using each type of payment are the same across ordinary and credit purchases.
In the ﬁrst setting the cost to consumers of using store credit is allowed to take
negative values. The idea is that store credit may sometimes provide beneﬁts to
consumers even for ordinary purchases, such as possibly allowing cardholders to
preserve their funds for some other contingencies. Thus, consumers will choose be-
tween cash, store credit, and credit cards (if they hold credit cards) when making
ordinary purchases. This change in assumptions turns out only to strengthen our
main results. Second, we consider the case in which the cost of using store credit is always
positive (cB ≥ 0) so that consumers would never want to use store credit for ordinary purchases
(cash would always be preferred). Instead, we endogenize the choice by consumers of whether
to hold a credit card in the ﬁrst place. We show this framework still leads to similar policy
implications to our benchmark case.
4.1 Allowing store credit for ordinary purchases
We follow the same steps as in section 3. The main impact of the additional types of possible
payment transactions is to make the deﬁnitions of the underlying terms Mi,Γ ( a), S (a)a n dφ(a)
more complicated, while leaving the structure of the analysis largely unaﬀected. As we will see,
allowing consumers to choose store credit when making ordinary purchases only strengthens the
policy implications of section 3. Essentially, it increases the number of situations in which it
is desirable to have consumers internalize the cost to merchants of providing store credit, and
thereby makes it more likely that the interchange fee aT = cS −cA maximizes consumer surplus.
We start by considering the retailer’s margins and demand arising from each type of transac-
tion. A fraction 1−xLi of the time, consumers cannot use credit cards. For ordinary purchases,
these consumers will use store credit if cB ≤ 0, which happens with probability H (0); otherwise,
with probability 1 − H (0) they will prefer to use cash. For credit purchases, which happen
with probability θ, these consumers will always use store credit. A fraction xLi of the time,
consumers can also use credit cards. For ordinary purchases, these cardholders will use store
credit if cB <L cf, and otherwise either credit cards (if Lc = 1) or cash (if Lc =0 ) .F o rc r e d i t18
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purchases, these cardholders will use store credit if cB <fand otherwise credit cards. Collect-
ing together a retailer’s margins associated with each of these diﬀerent possibilities, retailer i’s
expected margin per-customer is therefore equal to
Mi =( 1 − xLi)[(H (0) + θ)(pi − γ − cS)+( 1− H (0))(pi − γ)]
+xLi

H (Lcf)(pi − γ − cS)+( 1− H (Lcf))(pi − γ − Lcm)
+θ(H (f))(pi − γ − cS)+( 1− H (f))(pi − γ − m)

or after simplifying
Mi =( 1+θ)(pi − γ) − (H (0) + θ)cS − xΓ(a)Li,
where
Γ(a)=( H (Lcf) − H (0))cS +( 1− H (Lcf))Lcm + θ(1 − H (f))(m − cS).
Similarly, we can rewrite consumers’ expected utility and retailer i’s market share taking
into account the additional types of payment transactions that are possible. Retailer i oﬀers an
expected surplus (ignoring transportation costs) of
Ui =( 1 − xLi)

u0 + θu1 − (1 + θ)pi −
 0
cB


















Ui = u0 + θu1 − (1 + θ)pi −
 0
cB











(cB − f)dH (cB).









(cB + cS − c − πI)dH (cB) −
 ¯ cB
0
(c + πI)LcdH (cB).
The last two terms in φ(a)are similar to before. The ﬁrst term is new, reﬂecting that there may
be cost savings from using credit cards for ordinary purchases if this avoids the use of more costly19
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store credit. Together, the ﬁrst two terms represent total expected cost savings of the two users
(consumers and retailers) from using credit cards for consumers’ purchases (as opposed to using
store credit). The last term is the deadweight loss associated with convenience usage of credit
cards for ordinary purchases, although this now arises for fewer transactions since store credit is
now used for some ordinary transactions.
Aside from these new surplus deﬁnitions, the analysis of retailers’ decisions remains un-
changed. That is, retailer i’s market share and proﬁt expressions remain the same, as do propo-
sitions 1 and 2. Retailer i’s equilibrium price is now given by
(1 + θ)p∗




where the right-hand-side includes the additional term H (0)cS arising from the use of store
credit for some ordinary purchases by cash customers.14 Consumer surplus is similarly adjusted
for this additional term, and so now equals






(cB + cS)dH (cB) − θ(E (cB)+cS)+xφ(a).
Thus, aggregate consumer surplus is still equal, up to an additive and a positive multiplicative
constants, to total user surplus φ(a).
As before φ(a) has a jump (down) at a = a∗. However, the total user surplus function is
now more likely to be maximized for a higher interchange fee. The derivative φ  (a)i st h es a m e
as before except it is multiplied by (Lc + θ)/θ which exceeds one for a>a ∗. This also implies
aT which maximizes φ(a)f o ra>a ∗ is identical to before. That is, as before aT = cS − cA.
Proposition 3 now becomes
Proposition 4 If regulatory authorities aim at maximizing (short-term) consumer surplus, pri-
vately optimal interchange fees are too high. A regulatory cap on interchange fees can therefore
raise (short-term) consumer surplus, but two cases must be considered:
a) If δ<0 (regime 1)o ri f(c + πI)(1− H(0)) ≤ (1 + θ)
 0
−δ (cB + δ)dH(cB) (regime 2),
the regulatory cap should be aT = cS − cA.
b) Otherwise (regime 3), the regulatory cap should be a∗ = cI + πI.
14It is no longer the case that Γ(a) is necessarily increasing in a since Γ (a)=
(Lc + θ)(h(f)(m − cS)+( 1− H (f))) so that for m much below cS, higher interchange fees could actu-
ally lower prices. However, for m not too much below cS (i.e. a not too much below cS − cA), then prices will
still be increasing in interchange fees.20
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The proposition implies that the interchange fee aT = cS − cA achieves the global maximum
of φ(a)p r o v i d e d( i )δ<0, or equivalently aT ≤ a∗ = cI + πI (i.e provided Lc =0a taT) or (ii)




(cB + δ)dH (cB) ≥ (c + πI)(1− H(0)). (9)
Notice the trade-oﬀ here. The left-hand-side of (9) measures the cost saving from using credit
cards rather than store credit when credit cards have a negative fee as opposed to a zero fee. The
right-hand-side of (9) measures the additional costs to users from the use of credit cards rather
than cash for ordinary purchases when credit cards have a negative fee (and so are used whenever
cB > 0). Compared to before, the condition for case (ii) to apply is more easily satisﬁed since
the left-hand-side integral is the same as before except it is multiplied by 1 + θ instead of θ and
the right-hand-side integral is the same as before except it is multiplied by 1−H (0) instead of 1.
In other words, allowing for consumers to choose store credit when making ordinary purchases
only strengthens the previous policy implications.
4.2 Endogenizing card membership decisions
In this section, we consider an extension of the existing model in which consumers make prior
membership decisions, on whether to hold a credit card or not. Prior membership decisions
are potentially important since if interchange fee are set too low (for instance, at zero), then
consumers can be expected to face higher fees (for instance, the full cost of issuing cards) at
which point many consumers may choose to no longer hold credit cards. In order to simplify the
resulting model, we assume that consumers always view using store credit as costly (cB =0 ) .
With this assumption there is no issue about whether consumers can use store credit for ordinary
purchases; even if they could use store credit for these purchases, as was the case in section 4.1,
they would always prefer to use cash for this purpose. This assumption on cB will also imply
that, whenever f<0, cardholders will always want to use cards if they are accepted. In this
case, cardholders will never use store credit. However, as we will see, setting an interchange fee
such that f<0 may still be optimal for consumers (as opposed to setting an interchange fee
such that f = 0) since it induces more people to hold a credit card, thereby reducing the use of
expensive store credit for credit purchases by consumers who otherwise would not hold a credit
card.
The model is the same as before except that (i) there is an additional choice for consumers
as to whether to hold a card or not and (ii) we set cB = 0. Speciﬁcally, at the same time as21
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retailers choose their card acceptance policies (i.e. stage 3), consumers receive a random draw v
of the beneﬁt of holding a credit card and decide whether to hold the card or not. v is drawn
according to the distribution function Ψ over the support (−∞,v]f o rs o m ev>0. Let x(a)b e
the measure of consumers who join given an interchange fee a. Some consumers draw v<0, so
they would prefer not to hold a credit card other things equal (e.g. if they didn’t expect to use
it). This could also capture that there are signiﬁcant per-customer costs to issuers associated
with managing a cardholder which are passed through to cardholders. For other consumers,
cards may oﬀer more than just the ability to make transactions at retailers, in which case v>0
is possible.
We follow the same steps as in section 3. The assumption cB ≥ 0 is consistent with the
analysis in section 3 which assumes consumers never use store credit for ordinary purchases.
Therefore, the analysis of retailers’ decisions (which treat x as given), and the various surplus
expressions are identical to before. Note, however, that when f<0, then 1 − H (f)=1s i n c e
all cardholders will use credit cards rather than store credit, which is just a special case of the




(cB + cS − c − πI)dH(cB) − (c + πI)Lc,
which is now independent of a if a>a ∗ (so that Lc =1 ) :
a>a ∗ ⇒ φ(a) ≡ θ[E(cB)+cS] − (1 + θ)(c + πI).
In order to keep the analysis interesting, we assume
θ(E (cB)+cS) > (1 + θ)(c + πI), (10)
so that the surplus created from credit cards (the cost saving) is higher than their additional
cost to users when they are always used (i.e. when f<0). Without making the assumption
in (10), retailers would reject cards if and only if a>a ∗. Taking this into account, the card
network would set the interchange fee at a∗ and there would be no rationale for any regulation.
With (10), the card network will want to set a>a ∗, after which the interchange fee is neutral
in terms of usage decisions. Retailers will always accept cards no matter how high the fees and
cardholders will always use them. From the point of view of users (in aggregate), interchange
fees beyond a∗ just represent pure transfer fees. It will therefore be optimal for the card scheme
to set interchange fees to the point where all consumers hold cards. Not surprisingly, like before,
this will lead interchange fees to be set too high.22
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Using the expressions for Ucredit(a)a n dUcash(a) from section 3 but taking into account that




(cB − f)dH (cB) − Lcf
so consumers will hold cards if
v>L cf − θ
 ¯ cB
(1−Lc)f





(1−Lc)f (cB − f)dH (cB)
	
which is increasing in a.T a k i n gi n t o
account the additional utility from holding a card, total consumer surplus is equal to (up to an






When a>a ∗, this simpliﬁes to
 v
(1+θ)f−θE(cB)
(v + θ(E(cB)+cS) − (1 + θ)(c + πI)))dΨ(v).
As before, total surplus has a jump (down) at a = a∗. However, the total surplus function
behaves slightly diﬀerently for a>a ∗. It is maximum when
(1 + θ)f − θE(cB)=( 1+θ)(c + πI) − θ[E(cB)+cS].
After simplifying, we obtain the optimal value of f:




Since f is equal to cI +πI −a, we obtain that the interchange fee aT which maximizes total user




cS − cA. (11)
This is lower than aT = cS − cA in the benchmark model. Here the purpose of the optimal
interchange fee is to induce consumers to hold cards even when they otherwise would not want
to, so that they internalize retailers’ surplus from being able to accept their credit cards rather
than rely on store credit for credit purchases. Note the retailers’ surplus cS − cA only arises
a fraction θ/(1 + θ) of the time, whereas a fraction 1 − θ/(1 + θ) of the time, the retailer is
actually worse oﬀ by cA due to the excessive usage of cards. Following this interpretation, aT
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As in Proposition 3, which of aT or a∗ maximizes consumer surplus depends on the magnitude
of the incremental cost of store cards over credit cards, which is now measured by
ˆ δ = θcS − (1 + θ)(c + πI).
Proposition 5 If regulatory authorities aim at maximizing (short-term) consumer surplus, pri-
vately optimal interchange fees are too high. A regulatory cap on interchange fees can therefore
raise (short-term) consumer surplus, but two cases must be considered:
a) If ˆ δ<0 (regime 1) or if
 v
−θE(cB)




v + ˆ δ + θE(cB)
	
dΨ(v) (12)
(regime 2), the regulatory cap should be aT = θ
1+θcS − cA.
b) Otherwise (regime 3), the regulatory cap should be a∗ = cI + πI.
The proposition implies that the interchange fee aT = θ
1+θcS − cA achieves the global maxi-
mum of φ(a)p r o v i d e d( i )ˆ δ<0, or equivalently aT ≤ a∗ = cI + πI (i.e provided Lc =0a taT)
or (ii) if aT >a ∗ (i.e. Lc =1a taT) provided (12) holds. Given it may be hard to measure θ
with any conﬁdence or to evaluate whether (12) holds or not, a conservative regulatory approach
could again be to use aT = cS − cA as the regulatory cap since according to the model this (i)
increases consumer surplus relative to the privately set interchange fee; (ii) possibly maximizes
consumer surplus; and (iii) yet is never too low from the point of view of maximizing (short-term)
consumer surplus. Thus, in this alternative framework, policy implications remain remarkably
similar to our benchmark case in section 3.
5 Conclusions
Much of the existing literature on interchange fees treats payment cards as though they were
debit cards. This paper provides a new theory of interchange fees that is speciﬁcally applicable
to credit card networks. The model we provide captures a trade-oﬀ that can arise between the
excessive usage of credit cards for ordinary purchases and the importance of getting cardholders
who do need credit to internalize retailers’ avoided costs arising from their credit card usage. In
terms of this trade-oﬀ, we ﬁnd that an unregulated card network always sets the interchange fee
too high. Consumer surplus can be increased by imposing a cap on interchange fees which equals24
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the retailers’ net avoided costs from not having to provide credit themselves. Further lowering
interchange fees from this level towards issuing costs may either increase or decrease consumer
surplus, although initially consumer surplus always falls in our framework.
The possibility that the regulator’s preferred interchange fee predicted by our
theory may still be moderately high reﬂects the potentially high merchant beneﬁts
of accepting cards in these circumstances, which cardholders may not otherwise
internalize. Put diﬀerently, if the interchange fee is set too low (say at zero) so that
consumers were sometimes not willing to hold or use cards for such transactions,
then competing merchants will instead tend to rely more on store credit (or other
forms of credit) so as to attract business. Quite plausibly, the additional costs to
society of making greater use of these more expensive forms of credit will outweigh
any beneﬁt from encouraging debit rather than credit card transactions for ordinary
purchases. Some excessive use of credit cards may be unavoidable given merchants
cannot easily observe if credit is needed or not by their customers. This seems no
diﬀerent from the fact merchants that oﬀer interest-free installment plans to their
customers, will sometimes (perhaps often) end up oﬀering these plans to consumers
who actually do not need them.
One important direction for future research is to extend our model to allow retail-
ers to oﬀer diﬀerent prices (through the use of discounts, interest-free periods and
rewards) when consumers make use of store credit. In not allowing this possibility,
we had in mind such price diﬀerentials being exogenous for each retailer, deter-
mined perhaps through an association of retailers or being absent altogether due
to the inability of retailers to set diﬀerential prices based on a consumer’s choice of
payment technology. If retailers could discriminate based on the use of store credit
they may be able to induce consumers to use credit cards and store credit eﬃciently.
However, any individual retailer would still not be able to (nor have the incentive
to) use its diﬀerential pricing to get consumers to make the right decision about
whether to hold a credit card in the ﬁrst place. As such, our results from section
4, in which card membership is endogenized, are likely to carry over to the case
retailers can price discriminate in this way.
Another possible direction for future research is to extend our model to allow for
competing payment networks. By adapting the arguments of Guthrie and Wright
(2007) one should be able to show similar results to those shown here still hold25
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when there is competition between multiple card payment networks. The idea is
that competing networks will seek to choose an interchange fee somewhere between
the one maximizing total user surplus and that chosen by a monopoly network,
depending on the extent to which consumers choose to hold multiple cards, and so
these may still be too high.
We conclude by noting some other implications of our theory, which may be able to explain
real-world observations that have previously deﬁed theoretical explanation. If credit is more
likely to be needed by customers for large purchases, then the optimal interchange fee should
be ad valorem in our setting (thereby better targeting the transfer to cardholders for the types
of transactions where credit is needed). Thus, the model potentially provides a justiﬁcation for
the widespread use of ad valorem credit card interchange fees. It also explains why merchants
may want to reject credit cards for small transactions (where people are more likely to be able to
purchase anyway using cash). Most importantly, it explains why interchange fees are typically
lower for debit cards than for credit cards. Finally, the theory suggests large retailers that are
able to gain a competitive advantage over smaller rivals from being able to oﬀer their own store-
credit to customers, may have an interest in opposing the widespread use of general purpose
credit cards.26
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
From the text we have

















= t +( 1+θ)(pj − pi)+xS(a)(Li − Lj) − (1 + θ)(pi − γ)+θcS + xLiΓ(a).
At a Nash equilibrium, we have for i,j =1 ,2:
(1 + θ)(2pi − pj)=t + γ(1 + θ)+θcS + x(S(a)(Li − Lj)+LiΓ(a)).
Solving for pi, we obtain formula (5):
(1 + θ)pi = t + γ(1 + θ)+θcS + xΓ(a)Li +
x
3
φ(a)(Li − Lj). (13)
Substituting (13) into (3) and using (4) implies formula (6).
Proof of Proposition 3:




(cB + cS − c − πI)dH(cB) − (c + πI)1 Ia>a∗,














(cB + δ)dH(cB) − (c + πI)1 Iδ>0.




(cB + δ)dH(cB) > 0
(since cB + δ ≤ 0w h e ncB belongs to [0,−δ]). Thus φ is maximum for a = aT.




(cB + δ)dH(cB) − (c + πI).
This establishes Proposition 3.27
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